A perspective largely unexamined in past works on the Spanish Conquest of Mexico has been the details of the tactical systems of the respective sides, and how these systems worked on the battlefield to produce the Spanish victory. This article examines the Conquest in terms of tactics, applying a military-historical perspective to ethnohistorical texts and data gleaned from modern works. It is shown that Spanish infantry tactics and horse cavalry were critical factors in the Spanish victory. [Aztecs, ethnohistory, Mexico, Spanish Conquest, war]
Having received reinforcements and supplies, the Spanish again advanced on Mexico. Receiving the allegiance of a breakaway faction of the city of Texcoco, the Spanish subjugated the cities bordering the lakes of the Valley of Mexico and besieged the Aztecs in Tenochtitlan. After a 90-day siege the city fell on August 13, 1521.
Tactical Organization of the Spanish
The immediate question is how the two sides in this conflict used their forces and how that use led to victory for the Spanish and defeat for the Aztecs.
Spanish tactics of this period were an outgrowth of their experiences in both the Reconquista and the Italian campaigns, and the whole trend of the late Middle Ages in reasserting the superiority of infantry formations over cavalry. By the late fifteenth century the heavy knight had been displaced on the European battlefield by the common footsoldier. The pike was the preeminent weapon, supported by swordsmen, muskets, and artillery. An important result of these developments was the reintroduction of precision movement of units to the European battlefield.
For the Spanish, the proving ground for their new tactics was Italy, where they fought a series of protracted wars with the French at the turn of the sixteenth century. The essential evolution of Spanish tactics in this theater was the development of the general Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba, who integrated the elements of European arms into a functional, mutually-dependent system. The secret of Don Gonzalo's success was his evolution of new infantry tactics and his organization of the infantry into manageable, self-sufficient units: pikemen to resist the initial cavalry charge of a battle; arquebusiers to guard the flanks and enfilade the attackers; and infantry armed with javelins and the Roman-Spanish short sword, and protected by round shields, to move through the pikemen to the attack. The Great Captain died in 1515, but his tactics and his principle of the independent, selfsufficient infantry unit survived (Hills 1970: 53).
This tactical system revolved around a unit known as a tercio, roughly corresponding to a regiment in modern parlance (Hills 1970: 53). When standardized in 1534 the tercio consisted of twelve companies of 250 men each, six of pike, four of swordsmen, and two of arquebusiers (p. 53). "In column of route they marched; pikemen-swordsmen-pikemen, with the arquebusiers guarding the flanks and the vanguard" (pp. 53-54).
The key to this system was mutual support among the different companies. If one unit/ weapon-type failed, all might be lost. To insure against this, a well-drilled and disciplined order had to be maintained (Ropp 1959: 16; Jones 1987: 190-191) . Individual units were relentlessly trained to work together. This discipline enabled a commander to move and use his units efficiently, as well as keep them together in the face of an enemy attack.
The formal organization of the tercio, however, was not set until after Conquest. In the first years of the sixteenth century the organization of Spanish armies was flexible. Each town marched under its own banner with its own leader, and if it was large enough to have more than one calpolli, it would have one over-all leader, or tlahtoani, and subordinate leaders for each of the several calpolli units. These calpolli units were often dispersed among and incorporated into the larger armies of a major campaign, but they apparently were not divided. They were the basic command, logistical, and tactical units, and violating their integrity would have caused too many supply and control problems (Hassig 1988: 55-56 ).
In other words, tributary troops were not used in piecemeal replacements for Aztec units.
The mass of troops in the Aztec units were commoners. Davies (1988: 163-164) suggests that the highest positions were generally reserved for the nobility. However, lower "officer" ranks were typically held by commoners promoted for merit.
The calpulli forces were organized into units of 400 men, sub-divided into "squads," although the exact size of these sub-units is unclear (Hassig 1988: 56) . The "companies" of 400 were, in turn, organized into "divisions" of 8000, called xiquipeles (Diaz 1956 Because of this failure cavalry must be considered the "arm of decision" in the Conquest. However, because of their small numbers during the campaigns, and the varied terrain in which the fighting took place, cavalry alone would not have been sufficient to defeat the Aztecs. Spanish infantry and allies, by their ability to engage Aztec forces at close quarters, to pin their units down for the cavalry to charge and disrupt, and to operate in areas where cavalry were ineffective, were essential ingredients in Spanish force.
While engaging the Tlaxcalans, the Spanish found them to be brave but poorly led and badly deployed (Diaz 1956 But it was on the open battlefield that the fate of the Aztec nation was decided, both at Otumba, where the Spanish survived the Aztec's greatest attempt to crush them, and later in the battles that sealed off Tenochtitlan and allowed the Spanish to lay siege to the capital and strangle it into submission. The Conquest can be viewed as a classic case of a war won through superior tactics. The Spanish infantry formation was a more effective way of employing foot-soldiers than the Aztec system, and their cavalry was a tactical challenge largely unanswered. While the Aztecs and the Spanish were fighting the same kind of war, a fundamental difference between them was the manner in which they organized and used their respective forces, and that difference was critical.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article it was noted that most interpretations of the Spanish Conquest have attributed the Spanish victory to conceptual or technological factors. A difficulty with these interpretations may be that they tend to obviate examination of important functional reasons-actions on the battlefield-and produce the false impression that the Spanish Conquest was inevitable and could not have been stopped by the Aztecs. In this article a tactical/military historical perspective has been applied to ethnohistorical records of the Conquest in an attempt to understand these "on-the-ground" factors. The application of such a perspective to ethnohistorical works has potentially great utility in explicating actions and events which may otherwise be obscure and difficult.
Battle is a special sort of sociopolitical interac-tion. Warfare is not random violence but a calculated political act employing definable techniques. Success in battle is mediated through the tactical/ organizational concepts and usages of either side. When the combatants come from two widely different cultures, the need for a close examination of those concepts and usages is acute. Moreover, any war is won or lost because of a complex of reasons-psychological, organizational, and technical. Therefore, the inclusion of detailed discussion of tactical organization and practice is a necessary compliment to other explanations of the Conquest.5 A more thorough-going examination of the ethnohistokical records would reveal more about the tactics of the Conquest. In addition, many pertinent issues, such as logistics, the effects of disease on the Aztecs, and political control and strategy, must be included in an explanation. As an example of the last, Hassig has outlined another critical reason for the Spanish victory-their ability on a strategic level to take "advantage of existing cleavages within the [Aztec] system to split the empire, turn its members on the Aztecs, and rend it asunder" (1988: 267). Such a perspective complements the analysis here. Strategy and tactics are linked but functionally distinct aspects of any military campaign. For victory combatants must have success in both spheres. The Spanish had to strip the Aztecs of their subject groups, but without tactical success their diplomatic victories would have been meaningless.
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